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Abstract. The attitude of future generations towards environmental assets may
well be diﬀerent from ours, and it is necessary to take into account this possibility
explicitly in the current debate about environmental policy. The question we are
addressing here is: should uncertainty about future preferences lead to a more
conservative attitude towards environment? Previous literature shows that it is the
case when society expects that on average future preferences will be more in favor
of environment than ours, but this result relies heavily on the assumption of a
separability between consumption and environmental quality in the utility function.
We show that things are less simple when preferences are non-separable: the attitude
of the society now depends not only on the expectation of the change in preferences
but also on the characteristics of the economy (impatience, intertemporal flexibility,
natural capacities of regeneration of the environment, relative preference for the
environment), on its history (initial level of the environmental quality) and on the
date at which preferences are expected to change (near or far future).
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1. Introduction
The attitude of future generations towards environmental assets may
well be diﬀerent from ours for many reasons, some of which are obvious
and others unpredictable, since the formation of preferences involves
complex and interlinked economic, social and moral determinants. It
seems reasonable to think that we can infer future preferences from
ours for the near future but not for the far distant one. However,
environmental questions involve long-lasting phenomena, and current
decisions will have long-lasting consequences. So it is necessary to take
into account explicitly in the current debate about environmental policy
the possibility of changes in preferences in the future. The question we
are addressing here is: should uncertainty about future preferences lead
to a more conservative attitude towards environment?1
Intuition could let us think that we should be more conservative now
if we expect that future generations will value environment more than
we do. Previous literature seems to confirm this intuition.
Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993), Beltratti (1996) and Ayong
Le Kama (2001) consider the evolution of an economy whose consump-
tion is permitted by the depletion of an exhaustible natural resource.
Consumption is the sole source of welfare. A change in preferences
may take place in the future at an unknown date and it modifies in
an unknown way the level of utility associated to any level of con-
sumption. The authors look at the consequences of this change on the
optimal consumption path chosen by the central planner. They study
the optimal preservation policy and show that uncertainty on future
preferences leads to a more conservative use of the natural resource
when the central planner expects that on average the preferences of
future generations will be more in favor of environment than ours.
This paper studies more generally the optimal growth path of an
economy facing a dilemma of consumption vs environmental quality.
Consumption, which is a source of welfare, is permitted by the deterio-
ration of environmental quality but this deterioration in turn diminishes
welfare. Besides, consumption and environmental quality enter in a
non-separable way into the utility function, and the relative weight
of environmental quality is known with certainty only for the current
generations and could be modified in the future at an unknown date
and in an unknown direction. We then ask ourselves about the optimal
management of environmental quality when facing this uncertainty.
Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1998) also study the case in which
the stock of exhaustible resource is a source of welfare and find the
same intuitive result, but in a framework where the utility function
is separable. This will prove to have important consequences because,
aaks_ere2.tex; 29/10/2002; 16:56; p.3
4 A. AYONG LE KAMA and K. SCHUBERT
in the separable case, the marginal utility of consumption does not
depend on the preference for the resource, and so is not aﬀected by
the change in preferences as it is in the non-separable case. Brasão
and Cunha-e-Sâ (1998) extend the Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal
(1998) framework to a capital-resource growth model, but retain the
assumption of separable preferences. Their paper and this one taken
together represent a complete extension of the previous results..
In order to be able to establish comparisons, we first study the case
without any change in preferences (section 2). It will be our reference
case. We then have a very simple model of growth with environment
and the results are straightforward.
Section 3 explains the form taken by the change in preferences.
Section 4 presents the case in which a change in preferences of an
unknown direction occurs at a known date. We show that the optimal
path satisfies the turnpike property. Before the change in preferences,
the economymoves as long as possible near the optimal path when there
is no change, and then the path of environmental quality is bended to
reach its optimal target level at the time the change occurs. Under cer-
tain circumstances, it can be optimal for the central planner to adopt a
more conservative attitude from the beginning of the path to the date of
the change in preferences, as it is the case in the Beltratti, Chichilnisky
and Heal (1998) model. But whereas these circumstances depend only
of the expectation of the change in preferences in Beltratti, Chichilnisky
and Heal (1998), they are related here to the characteristics of the
economy (impatience, intertemporal flexibility, natural capacities of re-
generation of the environment, relative preference for the environment),
to its history (initial level of the environmental quality) and also to the
date at which preferences are expected to change (near or far future).
Furthermore the optimal path, even if it is more conservative than the
reference one, can only slightly be so for the near future, because of the
turnpike property.
We study in section 5 the general case in which both the direction
of the change and the time at which it will happen are unknown. We
show that the turnpike property does not hold anymore. Depending
on the initial level of environmental quality in relation to its stationary
value and on the characteristics of the economy, the central planner will
adjust consumption at the beginning of the optimal path upwards or
downwards. He will then put the economy on a stationary equilibrium
and wait there for the change in preferences to happen. In this case,
it can therefore be optimal for the central planner to adopt a more
conservative attitude at the beginning of the time horizon, as in the
Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993), Beltratti (1996) and Ayong Le
Kama (2001) models. It may then also happen that consumption and
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environmental quality decrease along the optimal path whereas they
increase in the reference case.
Last, section 6 studies the special —and simpler— case of additively
separable preferences and shows how the previous results are modified,
and section 7 concludes.
2. The model without change in preferences
We study an economy in which environmental quality  is depleted by
consumption , but regenerates itself at the constant rate   0. Its
evolution is then given by the following equation:
˙ =  − (1)
The central planner problem writes:



(0) = max
R∞
0 
−(	)


¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ˙ =  −	  ≥ 0
0 given ;   0
where  is the social discount rate.
We use a utility function (	) suitable with the existence of
constant rate growth paths of consumption and environmental qual-
ity. Smulders and Gradus (1996) show that a necessary condition for
the existence of such paths is that preferences are characterized by a
constant ratio of the value of environmental quality to the value of
consumption,  and  being valued at their marginal utility. This
implies utility functions of the Cobb-Douglas form, such as:
(	) =
³

´1− 1

1− 1

	 (2)
where  = 

 0	 which stands for the “relative preference for
environmental quality”, is constant in the course of time and  is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. We sup-
pose that  is strictly less than one2, which is suﬃcient to ensure
that  () is concave and that the marginal utility of environmental
quality decreases. Then the marginal utility of consumption increases
when environmental quality deteriorates (  0): utility exhibits a
compensation eﬀect, in the terminology of Michel and Rotillon (1996).
The current value Hamiltonian can be written as:
H = (	) + (−)
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 being the shadow price of environmental quality.
The first order necessary conditions are:



 = 
˙
 = −  −


˙

=  − 

(3)
and the transversality condition is:
lim
→∞
− = 0 (4)
By diﬀerentiating the first optimality condition and using the two
others we easily find the growth rate of consumption :
 =
˙

= 
·
−+ 
µ
1 + 
µ
1− 1

¶¶¸
+ 



Let us define  = 

; the previous equation allows us to write the
following, in the stationary variable :
˙

= − [+ (1− )(1 + )] + (1 + ) (5)
The stationary solution of this equation is then given by:
∗ = (1− ) + 
1 + 
	 (6)
which is strictly positive for   1. The equation is unstable, so
the economy will instantaneously switch to its stationary path at the
beginning of the time horizon.
We then have an economy in which the 

ratio is constant at the
level ∗ and  and  grow at the same rate , with:
 =  − ∗ = 
µ
 − 
1 + 
¶
 (7)
∗ =  is the 

ratio that ensures the constancy of environmental
quality and consumption. If ∗   i.e. if   (1 + )	 the level
of consumption along the optimal path is relatively high vis-à-vis the
level of environmental quality, and both decrease. This happens when
the central planner is very impatient, or natural regeneration is low, or
also the relative preference for environment is low. In the opposite case,
consumption and environmental quality increase along the optimal path
at the expense of a relatively small level of consumption.
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Moreover, it is easy to show that the transversality condition is
always satisfied and that the optimal value of the objective function is
finite (see Appendix A (i)):
(0) =
1
(1 + )∗
(∗0	 0) (8)
3. The switch in preferences
A switch in preferences occurs once and for all and takes the form of
a change in the relative preference for environment, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution  being given. We suppose that if this relative
preference is initially , it can become:
 =
(
   with probability  ∈ [0	 1]
   with probability 1− 
The corresponding utility functions are denoted by () and  ().
 can be interpreted as the level of sensitivity to environment of
the median consumer in an economy where a share  of consumers are
likely to increase their preference for environment in the future while
the others are likely to decrease it because of exogenous alterations of
tastes. Or alternatively  can be seen as the probability of irreversible
damage occurring to the environment in the future. This would enhance
each agent’s preference for environment at the time the change takes
place. 1− is the probability of non-occurrence of this same damage, in
which case concern for environment would decrease when uncertainty
is resolved. We suppose  ≥ 0	 so that environmental quality cannot
become a “bad” in the future.
For the central planner, the mathematical expectation of the new
preference for environment of the representative consumer is:
() = + (1− ) (9)
If () = 	 the central planner expects that preferences will not
change on average in the future. Following Beltratti (1996), Beltratti,
Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) and (1998), this case is called symmetric
uncertainty.
Moreover, it is important to notice that once the switch has oc-
curred, the problem becomes identical with the previous one, the initial
condition notwithstanding. So if the change in preferences appears at a
given time   0 the economy moves on a new growth path. It inherits
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an environmental quality 	 and, depending on the realization of ,
it is then characterized by:



 = 
³
 − 
1+
´
 = (1− ) + 
1+
or



 = 
µ
 − 1+
¶
 = (1− ) + 1+
Thus if after time  the preference for environment increases the
growth rate of the economy will be higher (  ), and vice versa. This
can be explained by the fact that a greater preference for environment
translates into a relative decrease of consumption (level eﬀect). This
results in a greater accumulation of environmental quality and a greater
growth rate (growth eﬀect).
The value of the intertemporal welfare on the path followed after
the change in preferences in each case is denoted by (	 ) or (	 ).
4. The model with an uncertain change in preferences at a
known date
We first study the case in which the central planner knows with cer-
tainty that a change in the relative preference for environment will
occur at a given time  , but does not know what change. This date
can be broadly seen as the date at which the “present” generations are
replaced by new generations, the “future” generations, about which we
obviously lack informations because our life cycle does not overlap with
theirs3.
4.1. The problem and its resolution: a turnpike property
The central planner program writes (see Dasgupta and Heal (1974)):



max
R 	
0 
−(	)
+ −	((	 ))
˙ =  − 
	  ≥ 0
0 given,
where the mathematical expectation of the remaining stock at the date
of the change in preferences i.e. the expected bequest to the future
generations is:
((	 )) = (	 ) + (1− )(	 ) (10)
The first order necessary conditions characterizing the evolution of
the economy before the change in preferences are the same as when
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preferences are unchanged. The dynamic equation in the stationary
variable  is then still (5).
We must add to the first order conditions the following transversality
condition:
	 = (
0(	 )) = 
0
(	 ) + (1− ) 0(	 )	 (11)
which states that when the change in preferences occurs, the shadow
price of environmental quality must be equal to the expected marginal
value of the remaining stock.
We show (see Appendix A (ii)) that 
0
(	 ) = (	 		 ) and
 0(	 ) = (	 		 ), and besides we know from the first order
conditions that 	 = (		 		 )	 where 	 is without ambiguity
in notation the value of the ratio of consumption to environmental
quality just before the change in preferences. So the expected marginal
utility of consumption is the same immediately before the change in
preferences and immediately afterwards:
(		 	 	 ) = (	 		 ) + (1− )(	 		 )
This relationship allows us to obtain the value of the ratio of consump-
tion to environmental quality just before the change occurs:
	 = (	 )	 (12)
with:
 () =
h
−
1
(−)(1−
1
 ) + (1− )−
1
(−)(1−
1
 )
i−
 0 ∀
(13)
We will call equation (12) the No Expected Jump condition (NEJ).
The solution of the diﬀerential equation in  (5) is given by:
1

− 1
∗
=
µ
1
0
− 1
∗
¶
(1+)

∗ ∀ ∈ [0	  ]  (14)
This equation is unstable. So the only solution is to choose 0 as
close to ∗ as possible, then to stay as long as possible near the refer-
ence path, and finally to bend the path to hit the target 	  This is
reminiscent of the well-known turnpike property.
We easily show that the solution of the diﬀerential equation in  is:

0
= (−

∗)
·
0
∗
+
µ
1− 0
∗
¶
(1+)

∗
¸ 1
1+
∀ ∈ [0	  ]  (15)
Now, taking equations (14) and (15) at date  and eliminating 0
allows us to write the Euler condition:
	 = Ψ(	 )	 (16)
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with:
Ψ(	 ) = 
∗
µ

sup


¶1+
− 1
(1+)

∗	 − 1
	 (17)
where sup	 = 0
	 is the maximal value that 	 can reach4.
The Euler condition together with the Non Expected Jump condi-
tion show us that the optimal level of environmental quality at the time
the change occurs solves the following equation:
Ψ(	 ) =  (	 ) (18)
PROPOSITION 1. There is a unique solution to the problem with an
uncertain change in preferences at a certain date.
Proof. We have Ψ()  0 ∀, lim
→0
Ψ() = +∞	 Ψ(sup	 ) = 0 and
Ψ
0
()  0.
So Ψ () is positive and strictly decreasing from +∞ to 0 on the interval
[0	sup	 ] 
We also have, for any given  ∈ [0	 1] 	  ()  0 ∀ ∈ [0	 sup	 ] and
(sup	 )  0.
First, for  ∈ ]0	 1[ 	 lim
→0
() = 0	 and

0
() = (1− ) ()
1

+1

³
( − )−
1
(−)(1−
1

) + ( − )(1− )−
1
(−)(1−
1

)
´
	
with  0() T 0 for  S e()	 unique, such that:
e() = " (− )
(− )(1− )
µ


¶ 1

# 1
(−)(1− 1
 )
 (19)
So for  ∈ ]0	 1[ 	  () is positive, strictly increasing on the inter-
val
h
0	 e()h, and decreasing afterwards. As (sup	 )  0, there is a
unique intersection between theΨ () and  () functions on the interval
[0	sup	 ] 
Now for  = 1	  () is strictly increasing from 0 to  (sup	 )  0 So
there is also a unique intersection between the Ψ () and  () functions
on the interval [0	sup	 ] 
Last, for  = 0	  () is a concave function decreasing from infinity
to zero. It can still easily be shown that there is a unique intersection
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between the Ψ () and  () functions on the interval [0	sup	 ]  Equation
(18) now writes:
∗
µ

sup


¶1+
− 1
(1+)

∗	 − 1
= 
(−)(1−)
	 	
which is equivalent to:
∗
(1+)

∗	 − 1
h
(sup	 )
1+ −1+	
i
= 
1++(−)
	 
The LHS of this last equation is strictly decreasing from 

∗
(1+)
∗−1 (
sup
	 )
1+
to 0	 while the RHS is strictly increasing from 0 to  (sup	 )
1++(−)
on the interval [0	sup	 ].
Knowing the optimal value of 	 , we can find the optimal paths
of environmental quality and consumption before the change in prefer-
ences:
− for environmental quality:
 = 0

·
0
∗
+
µ
1− 0
∗
¶
(1+)

∗
¸ 1
1+
∀ ∈ [0	  ] (20)
with
0 =
∗
1 + (∗ (	 )−1 − 1) −(1+)
∗	
(21)
− for consumption:
 = 0

·
0
∗
+
µ
1− 0
∗
¶
(1+)

∗
¸− 
1+
∀ ∈ [0	  ] (22)
with 0 = 00.
Notice that it is possible to show, after a few manipulations, that
(	)
(0	0)
= (1−
1

)(1+) ∀ ∈ [0	  ] :
the utility grows at a constant rate on the optimal path prior to the
change in preferences, and this constant rate is identical to the growth
rate reached when preferences do not change.
Figure 1 depicts the NEJ and Euler conditions in the (	) plane
and the phase diagram, and shows the paths followed by the economy
before the change in preferences and afterwards, in the case where
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the reference growth rate is positive and where the NEJ and Euler
conditions cross above ∗. When uncertainty about the direction of the
change resolves, consumption and the ratio of consumption to environ-
mental quality jump upwards if there is a decrease in the preference
for environment and downwards otherwise. In the first case, time 
consumption and  ratio are high. This is due to the impatience of the
economy associated with its low relative preference for environment,
and finally leads to a decrease of consumption and environmental qual-
ity in the course of time because of an insuﬃcient accumulation of
environmental quality. It is the opposite in the second case.
figure 1 here
4.2. A comparison with the reference path
We now come to the point that motivated this study: is the society
more or less conservative in the presence of an uncertainty about future
preferences?
4.2.1. The definition of a more conservative society
Let’s first define more precisely what we mean by conservative.
DEFINITION. We will say that the society is more conservative in
the presence of an uncertainty if the path of the ratio of consumption
to environmental quality is under its reference path (its path without
uncertainty), from the origin to the date at which preferences change.
The society will be all the more conservative as the distance between
the two trajectories will be great.
First of all, equation (21) shows that 0  ∗ iﬀ ∗   (	 )
i.e., with equation (12), iﬀ 	  ∗. Moreover, the motion of  is
monotonous so, if the path of  is under the reference path at the
origin and also when preferences change, it will be under it in between.
Our definition of a more conservative society is thus meaningful.
Furthermore, we show in Appendix A (ii) that the marginal value
of the bequest is, at the date of the change in preferences,

¡
 0(	 )
¢
= 
− 1

	
"


1


(1− 1 )
	 +
1− 

1


(1− 1 )
	
#
;
besides, the marginal utility of consumption is at the same date, on the
reference path,
(
∗	 	 	 ) = 
∗ − 1 
− 1

+(1− 1 )
	 ;
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so
( 0(	 ))
(∗	 		 )
=
µ
∗
(	 )
¶ 1


The central planner will thus be more conservative if the expected
marginal value of the bequest is higher than the reference marginal
utility of consumption at the time the change occurs.
Equation (21) also shows that if the date  at which preferences
change is far from now 0 is very close to ∗ (turnpike property) so,
as the initial environmental quality 0 is the same with and without
the change in preferences, the initial consumption is very close to its
reference value. So, even if the central planner is more conservative, he
will not be much more conservative at the beginning of the trajectory
if the change is to happen in the far future.
We can verify that if the optimal path is more conservative than
the reference one, society enjoys a higher environmental quality at the
time the change in preferences occurs: using equation (18) it is easy to
show, after some manipulations, that ∗   (	 )⇔ 	  0	 .
We can also show (see Appendix B) that if the optimal path is
more conservative than the reference one consumption is smaller on the
optimal path than on the reference one when the change in preferences
occurs: 	  ∗0	 ; that is not obvious because 	 = 		 	 with
	  
∗ but 	  0	 
4.2.2. The conditions for a more conservative society
Now, if ∗ = (	 ) i.e. if 	 = 0	 	 the optimal path is exactly
identical to the reference one before the change in preferences. Equation
(18) shows that:
	 T 0	 ⇔ Ψ(0	 ) T  (0	 )⇔ ∗ T (0	 )
Figure 2 draws the  () function for diﬀerent values of the prob-
ability 	 in order to find the (qualitative) conditions for which the
optimal path is more or less conservative than the reference one.
figure 2 about here
There exists a level of environmental quality denoted b such that
( b) is the same for every possible value of the probability 	 and it is
easy to find this level:
b = µ

¶ 1
(−)(1−)
(23)
We have:
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 ( b) = Ã−
−
! 1
−
and we show in Appendix C that  ( b)  ∗
Besides, using equations (23) and (19), we can find the probability
 for which the maximum of the () function is b :
b = e() ⇐⇒ µ

¶ 1
(−)(1−)
=
"
(− )
( − )(1− )
µ


¶ 1

# 1
(−)(1− 1

)
⇐⇒ + (1− ) = 
⇐⇒ () = 
⇐⇒  =
 − 
 − 
and for  S −
− we have
e() S b.
Finally, when the central planner knows with certainty that the
relative preference for environment will increase ( = 1), the ()
function is strictly increasing from zero to infinity, and we define b1
by:
 ( b1)¯¯¯
=1
= ∗
Symmetrically, when the central planner knows with certainty that the
relative preference for environment will decrease ( = 0), the ()
function is strictly decreasing from infinity to zero, and we define b0
by:
 ( b0)¯¯¯
=0
= ∗
We easily show that:



b0 = ¡ 

∗ ¢ 1(−)(1−)b1 = ³
∗
 ´ 1(−)(1−)b1  b  b0
(24)
We then see that if 0	 is low and, more precisely, if 0	  b1	
the central planner will be all the more conservative than the probabil-
ity of the change is high. We will call this case a case of “bad reference
path”. A society experiencing a bad reference path has poor environ-
mental conditions (the initial environmental quality 0 is low and so is
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the natural regeneration rate ), is very impatient (the social discount
rate  is high), and does not care very much about environment ( is
low); furthermore, it expects that the change in preferences will happen
in the near future ( is small) and so uncertainty is pressing. Such a
society will have incentives to be more conservative if the probability of
a positive change of the relative preference for environment is very high.
In this case, we will say that the central planner adopts a precautionary
behavior.
If, on the contrary, 0	  b0	 which is the case depicted in Figure
2 for diﬀerent probabilities of a positive change in the relative prefer-
ence for environment , then the central planner will be all the more
conservative than the probability of a positive change is low. This case is
a case of “good reference path”. A society on a good reference path has
fair environmental conditions, is patient and cares about environment.
The central planner will have incentives to be more conservative only
if he expects a decrease in the relative preference for environment in
the far future. In this case, we will say that he adopts an insurance
behavior against a worsening of environmental conditions.
Finally, if b1 ≤ 0	 ≤ b0	 the society will never be more conser-
vative, whatever the probability  of a positive change in the relative
preference for environment.
5. The problem with an uncertain change in preferences at
an uncertain date
We now suppose that when he decides of the path followed by the
economy the central planner knows neither what the future generations
preferences will be nor the date at which a change in preferences could
occur. The two types of uncertainty are independent. The full problem
is then: 


max
hR 	
0 
−(	 )
+ −	(	 )
i
˙ =  −
	  ≥ 0
0 given,
where the date  at which the change in preferences occur is a random
variable, with marginal density  and Ω =
R∞
 
 . The maximand
of this problem can be reformulated as:
max
Z ∞
0
	
"Z 	
0
−(	)
+ 
−	((	 ))
#
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or, after integrating by part (see Dasgupta and Heal (1974)):
max
Z ∞
0
− [Ω(	) + (())] 

5.1. Analytical resolution
The current value Hamiltonian is:
H = Ω(	) + (()) + (−)	
and the first order conditions are:(
Ω = 
˙
 = −  − 

 −

Ω(
0())
Diﬀerentiating the first optimality condition and using ˙

=  − 

we obtain:
˙

= 
µ
1 + 
µ
1− 1

¶¶
 − + 

− 
Ω
·
1− (
0())

¸
	 (25)
where Ω is the probability for the change to occur at time  given that
it has not previously occurred.
We have seen (Appendix A (ii) and previous section) that the ratio
of the marginal value of the bequest to the reference marginal utility
of consumption is, at a given date 	 (
0())
(
)
=
³


 ()
´ 1
 with ()
previously defined (equation (13)). So we obtain the following equation
for the growth rate of consumption before the change in preferences:
˙

= 
·µ
1 + 
µ
1− 1

¶¶
 − − 
Ω
¸
+  + 

Ω
µ

()
¶ 1

 (26)
Assumption 1: The marginal density  of the random future date
 at which the change in preferences occurs is a Poisson process with
constant parameter  Thus we have Ω =  ∀
Under this assumption and using equation (26), the diﬀerential equa-
tions in  and  characterizing the evolution of the economy and the
environment before the change in preferences are:




˙


= (1 + )(− ∗) + 
µ³


 ()
´ 1
 − 1
¶
˙

=  − 
(27)
aaks_ere2.tex; 29/10/2002; 16:56; p.16
GROWTH, ENVIRONMENT AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE PREFERENCES 17
5.1.1. Existence of a stationary equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium (	) of this system is characterized by

˙

 =
˙
 = 0. This leads to  =  and  is a solution of the following
equation:
() = 
·
1− 1 + 


¸−
 (28)
We have to make sure that the term into brackets in the RHS of this
equation is positive5. It needs   (1+ )− When this condition is
fulfilled, for  ∈ ]0	 1[ if ( e())   h1− 1+


i−
(with e() defined
in equation (19)), equation (28) does not admit any solution, and for
the opposite case there exist two solutions. For  = 0 or 1 there is a
unique stationary equilibrium.
5.1.2. Stability of stationary equilibria
When we linearize the dynamic system (27) around a steady state —
when it exists— we get the following Jacobian matrix:
 =
Ã
+  −
h
1− 1+


i1+
 0()
− 0
!
with   0 and det of the opposite sign as  0(). Among the two
possible values of  we must then choose the smallest one in order to
have  0()  0 and consequently a saddle-path.
Notice that for  = 0	 given that  0()  0	 ∀ even if there exists
a stationary equilibrium, this equilibrium is unstable.
PROPOSITION 2. For any given  ∈ ]0	 1] 	 if   (1 + ) −  and
( e()) ≥  h1− 1+


i−
there exists a stable path solution of the
problem with an uncertain change in preferences at an uncertain date
whose stationary equilibrium is a saddle-point characterized by  = ,
() = 
h
1− 1+


i−
and  0()  0
When this solution exists, note that we have




= − 1
 0()
(1 + )
2

·
1− 1 + 


¸−−1
	
which has the opposite sign as  Thus when the parameters are such
that consumption and environmental quality grow in the reference case,
the stationary level of environmental quality  is all the smaller as
the flow probability of occurrence of the change in preferences is high.
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In order to finish to characterize the path prior to the change in
preferences, we have to find 0 as a function of 0 and the shape of
the convergence to the stationary state.
The negative root of matrix  is:
 =
1
2

+ −
s
(+ )2 + 4
·
1− 1 + 


¸1+
 0()

 
One can find the initial condition necessary and suﬃcient for the econ-
omy to converge to the saddle-point along the linearized path:
0 =  + 
µ
1− 0

¶
 (29)
5.2. A comparison with the reference path
The society will be more conservative in the uncertain case than in the
reference case if the path of the ratio of consumption to environmen-
tal quality is under its reference path i.e. if 0  ∗ and   ∗6
This latter condition is satisfied if the growth rate of the economy in
the reference case  is negative. The former can be written, due to
equation (29), as  + 
³
1− 0

´
 ∗ ⇔ 0 
¡
1 + 

¢
 The initial
environmental quality must then be rather low. Furthermore, the ratio
of consumption to environmental quality decreases along the optimal
path (but at a smaller rate than in the reference case) iﬀ 0   = 	
which needs 0  	 and increases otherwise.
Besides, given the shape of the  () function, we see easily that,
for a given set of parameters such that consumption and environmental
quality decrease in the reference case (  0) and for  given, we have

h
1− 1+ 
i−
   ∗   ( b) ≤  ³ e()´ ∀ ∈ ]0	 1] 	 b being the
environmental quality for which  () is the same for every possible
value of the probability  and e() being the maximum of the ()
function for a given probability  ∈ ]0	 1]. So in this case there exists a
unique solution to equation (28) on the increasing branch of the ()
function, and this solution, the stationary level of environmental quality
	 is all the higher since the probability of a positive change in prefer-
ences () is high. Everything takes place as if the central planner of an
economy experiencing a poor reference growth would, while waiting for
the change in preferences to happen, put this economy on a stationary
path characterized by an environmental quality all the higher as the
probability of a positive change is high.
Things are similar when the parameters are such that   0 and

h
1− 1+


i−
 ( b):  is all the higher since  is high.
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But things are diﬀerent when   0 and 
h
1− 1+


i−
  ( b)
We can find the probability 	 denoted by e	 for which  ( e(e)) =

h
1− 1+


i−
 If ()  	 e is the highest probability for which a
solution to equation (28) exists, and the nearer  is to e the higher is
. If ()  	 e is the smallest probability for which a solution to
equation (28) exists, and the higher is  with respects to e the smallest
is  So in the case of an economy enjoying a great reference growth (
high enough to imply 
h
1− 1+


i−
 ( b)) and of a central planner
expecting that on average the future preference for environment will
be greater than the present one (()  ), this central planner will,
while waiting for the change in preferences to happen, put the economy
on a stationary path characterized by an environmental quality all the
poorer as the probability of a positive change is high.
Figure 3 shows the phase diagram in the (	) plane and the path
followed by the economy when the growth rate in the reference case
is positive (thus the society is less conservative) and the initial envi-
ronmental quality 0 is greater than the stationary one . The latter
depends only on parameters (social discount rate, natural regeneration
rate, preference parameters) and on the probabilities  and . As in
the reference case consumption is growing, we have seen that  is all
the smaller as  is high.
In this case where we have an initial stock greater than the sta-
tionary one, even though it is optimal for the chosen parameters to let
consumption and environmental quality grow in the reference case at
the expense of a small initial consumption, it is optimal in the case with
uncertainty to consume a great deal at the beginning of the path and
to let consumption and environmental quality decrease towards their
stationary value.
figure 3 here
6. The special case of separable preferences
In the case of a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption, the initial utility function is additively separable and is
stated simply as (	) = ln+ ln. We study this case in order to
stress the importance of the non-separability assumption, which allows
us to obtain qualitatively diﬀerent results.
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6.1. The model without change in preferences
The problem is solved as in the general case. Equations (6) and (7)
become: (
∗ = 1+
 =  − ∗ =  − 1+ 
6.2. The case of an uncertain change in preferences at a
certain date
The path subsequent to the change in preferences is easily deduced
from the general case.
As for the path prior to the change in preferences, we now have:
() =
µ


+
1− 

¶−1
= 
h
1 +  + (1− )
i−1
=

1 + ()
with () given by equation (9).  () does not depend on  any
more; so equation (18) becomes
∗
µ

sup


¶1+
− 1
(1+)

∗	 − 1 =

1 +()
	 (30)
and allows us to obtain 	 explicitly:
	 = 0
	
µ
1 +()
1 + + (()− )−	
¶ 1
1+
	 (31)
where 0	 is the level of environmental quality at time  when there
is no change in preferences. A case of symmetric uncertainty in the
sense of Beltratti (1996), Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) and
(1998) can appear here, corresponding to () =  + (1 − ) = .
Then 	 = 0	 and the economy follows the reference path before
the change in preferences. We obviously have 	  0	 iﬀ () 
 and 	  0	 otherwise: the central planner who expects on
average a positive change in the relative preference for environment
will choose to have a more conservative attitude towards environment,
and the planner who expects on average a decrease in the preference
for environment will be less conservative.
The transversality condition (equation (12)) now writes 	 =  =

1+() and we have 	 S ∗ ⇔ () T 
Lastly, we can show that 0 is explicitly given by:
0 =
∗
1 +
¡

∗

− 1
¢
−(1+)
∗	
=

1 + + (()− )−	 	 (32)
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and we see that 	  0  ∗ ⇔ ()   The turnpike property
does not hold anymore: if the central planner expects that on average
the preference for environment will be greater in the future, the ratio
of consumption to environmental quality is always smaller than in the
reference case before the change in preferences, that is to say that the
society is always more conservative.
6.3. The case of an uncertain change in preferences at an
uncertain date
The system (27) is now written as:




˙


= −(+ ) + (1 + + 1+()

)
˙

=  − 
 immediately takes its stationary value, given by:
ee = + 
1 +  + 1+()

=

1 + +()
+
that is, everything takes place as if the preference for environment
would become +()
+ 	 a weighted average of the actual () and the
expected (()) relative preferences for the environment, the weights
being respectively the impatience of the society () and its appreciation
of risk (). We easily show that:
ee S ∗ ⇐⇒ () T 
Consumption and environmental quality evolve at a rate − ee until
uncertainty is resolved. If ee  ∗ this rate is greater than in the case
without change in preferences, and the initial consumption smaller.
The optimal behavior towards environment is more conservative —this
is rather intuitive— since the central planner expects an increase in the
relative preference for environment.
7. Concluding remarks
The question we have addressed here is: should uncertainty about
future preferences lead to a more conservative attitude towards en-
vironment? Beltratti (1996), Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993)
and (1998), and Ayong Le Kama (2001) answer that if we believe
that future generations will have on average a stronger preference for
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environment than ours, then our optimal attitude is to be more con-
servative from now. We have shown that this result suﬀers from a lack
of generality and strongly depends on the assumption of a separability
of consumption and environmental quality in the utility function. But
the issue of whether such a utility function is separable or not is very
hard to ascertain, and it seems useful to study the implications of a
non-separability.
In the case where the central planner knows with certainty when the
change in preferences will occur, we have shown that before the change
actually happens he never has strong incentives to be immediately more
conservative, relative to the situation without change in preferences.
The optimal behavior is to stay close to the reference path now and
in the near future, and to become notably more conservative near the
date of the change in preferences under certain conditions related to
the characteristics of the economy, its history, and the value of the
probability of a positive change in preferences.
In the case where there is besides uncertainty about the date at
which the change in preferences will occur, it can be optimal for the
central planner to adopt a conservative attitude as in the Beltratti,
Chichilnisky and Heal (1998) model, even if the motives of conservation
are diﬀerent. This happens when the growth rate of the economy is neg-
ative in the reference case (high social discount rate, small regeneration
rate and/or small relative preference for environment) and when the
initial environmental quality is low. But, depending on the characteris-
tics of the economy, it may also occur that the central planner, knowing
that a change in preferences will take place, but knowing neither when
nor in which direction, will lead the economy to consume very highly
before the change occurs, as an insurance against latter deprivations.
We probably have good reasons to suspect that people will care
more about environment in the future than we do now, for example
because environmental problems will become more pressing. We show
that under our assumptions it is not in itself a suﬃcient motive for
modifying notably our present behavior. If the decision maker ignores
the time at which the change in preferences will occur, two kinds of
behaviors are possible. Firstly, if the economy has poor prospects of
growth and a bad environmental quality, it will rather adopt a pre-
cautionary behavior and be more conservative. But if on the contrary
the growth path without change in preferences is favourable and the
environmental quality fair, the society will rather adopt a behavior of
insurance against later deprivations, consisting in consuming a great
deal now at the expense of environmental quality. This could explain
for example the attitude of many developed countries in the face of the
global warming prospect.
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Appendix
A. The value of the intertemporal welfare
(i) In the problem without change in preferences we know that con-
sumption and environmental quality grow at the same rate −∗	 and
that their ratio is constant at the level ∗ So we can write:
(0) = (0	0)
Z ∞
0
−(−

∗)(1+)(1− 1

)

= (0	0)
Z ∞
0
−(+(1−)(1+))

= (∗0	 0)
1
(1 + )∗
	
which is finite for any finite value of 0, given that ∗  0
(ii) Now, given the value of (0)	 we deduce the marginal intertem-
poral welfare:
 0(0) =
1
(1 + )∗
[∗(0	0) + (0	0)]
=
1
(1 + )∗
[∗(0	0) + 
∗(0	 0)]
= (
∗0	0)
Thus we also have the marginal values of the bequest in the problem
in which preferences change:(

0
(	 ) = (	 		 )
 0(	 ) = (	 		 )	
and the expected marginal value of the bequest:

¡
 0(	 )
¢
= (	 		 ) + (1− )(	 		 )
= 
− 1

	
"


1


(1− 1 )
	 +
1− 

1


(1− 1 )
	
#

B. Consumption when the central planner is more
conservative, in the case of an uncertain change in
preferences at a certain date
When the optimal path is more conservative than the reference one the
value of consumption on the optimal path is not obviously smaller than
aaks_ere2.tex; 29/10/2002; 16:56; p.23
24 A. AYONG LE KAMA and K. SCHUBERT
on the reference one when the change in preferences occurs because,
	 = 		 	 with 	  ∗ but 	  0	 
Equation (22) allows to write:
	
∗0	
=
0
∗
·
0
∗
+
µ
1− 0
∗
¶
(1+)

∗	
¸− 
1+
and
	
∗0	
 1 ⇐⇒ 0
∗

·
0
∗
+
µ
1− 0
∗
¶
(1+)

∗	
¸ 
1+
⇐⇒
µ
0
∗
¶ 1+


0
∗
+
µ
1− 0
∗
¶
(1+)

∗	
which is always verified if the society is more conservative, because in
this case 
0
∗  1
C. The position of the  () function
( b)  ∗ ⇐⇒ ∗ −  −−
⇐⇒
µ
∗

¶−

µ

∗
¶−
⇐⇒ (− ) ln
µ
∗

¶
 (− ) ln
µ

∗
¶
which happens to be true if ∗	  and  are not too diﬀerent:






∗ = 1+


∗
µ
1
1+ −
1
1+
¶
= 1 + 

∗
−
(1+)(1+)



∗ = 1 +


∗
³
1
1+
− 11+
´
= 1 + 

∗
−
(1+)(1+)
=⇒



ln 


∗ ' 
∗
−
(1+)(1+)
ln 

∗ ' 
∗ −(1+)(1+)
thus
(−) ln
µ

∗
¶
+(−) ln
µ

∗
¶
' 
∗
(− )(− )
1 + 
"
1
1 + 
− 1
1 + 
#
 0
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Notes
1 Heal and Kriström stress the relevance of this question in the case of climate
change.
2 In section 6, we study the special case of additively separable utility functions
( = 1).
3 These future generations could be let’s say the generations beginning with the
children of our grandchildren, who will be grown up in fifty years or so.
4 Before the change in preferences occurs, environmental quality  grows at the
rate ( − ) with  ≥ 0 So for 0 given,  ≤ sup 
5 This is always the case when  ≤ 0
6 It may happen that the society is actually more conservative with 0  ∗ and
  
∗	 if uncertainty resolves at a early date 
 such that   ∗; we do not
however describe this situation as more conservative, because the central planner
does not intend to be so.
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Figure 1. Change in preferences at a certain date, non-separable preferences, case
    0,   0,   0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Figure 2. Change in preferences at a certain date, non-separable preferences, case   0,
0
	  b0
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Figure 3. Change in preferences at an uncertain date, non-separable preferences, case
  0,     0,   0
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